

**STATE OF MICHIGAN**  
**COURT OF APPEALS**

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In the Matter of CHANEL MOORE, a/k/a  
CHANTEL KATHERINE MOORE, Minor.

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FAMILY INDEPENDENCE AGENCY,

Petitioner-Appellee,

v

BETTY BILLINGSLEA,

Respondent-Appellant,

and

WARREN JASPER MOORE,

Respondent.

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UNPUBLISHED

October 13, 2000

No. 221400

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 97-354348

Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Saad and Meter, JJ.

**MEMORANDUM.**

Respondent-appellant Billingslea (hereinafter “respondent”) appeals as of right from a family court order terminating her parental rights to the minor child pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) and (j); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(3)(g) and (j). We affirm.

As part of a Parent/Agency Agreement concerning two of her other children, respondent entered a drug treatment program in December 1997. During her pregnancy with the minor child, however, respondent used cocaine and heroin, which complicated the pregnancy. The minor child was born in September 1998, and tested positive for heroin and cocaine at birth. Respondent tested positive for cocaine use when she entered an outpatient drug program in March 1999, though she claimed she last used drugs in December 1997. Respondent gave conflicting responses concerning the last date she used drugs, stated she did not know heroin would hurt the baby, denied using cocaine during her pregnancy, and could not explain why the child tested positive for cocaine at birth.

Although the trial court's opinion incorrectly states the beginning date of respondent's outpatient therapy and number of drug screens that she submitted, these factual inaccuracies do not affect our conclusion that petitioner adduced sufficient clear and convincing evidence to warrant termination under § 19b(3)(g). *In re Sours*, 459 Mich 624, 640 n 4; 593 NW2d 520 (1999); *In re Miller*, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989). Because only one statutory ground for termination must be established in order to terminate parental rights, *In re Sours, supra*, we need not decide whether termination was also proper under §19b(3)(j). Finally, because the evidence did not establish that termination of respondent's parental rights was clearly not in the child's best interests, the family court did not err in terminating respondent's parental rights to the child. MCL 712A.19b(5); MSA 27.3178(598.19b)(5), *In re Trejo*, 462 Mich 341, 350, 364-365; 612 NW2d 407 (2000).

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh  
/s/ Henry William Saad  
/s/ Patrick M. Meter